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Abstract 
This comparative analysis reviews literature from the perspective of legal, 
sociological, political and engineering disciplines. The interdisciplinary approach allows 
for a holistic examination of what problems persist in commissioning of elections. In 
many cases, practical engineering considerations are forced to defer to legal precedent. I 
blend both historical and contemporary issues regarding elections and democracy in the 
United States, and I trace the failures of the election system to achieve full 
enfranchisement. I discuss these legal battles in the context of maintaining secure 
elections. I review technological aspects of elections and various election systems. A newly 
developed tool, the Perspective On Issues Map, analyzes and illustrates the compendium 
of these aspects of the voting system in one graphic. Finally, I ask questions for future 
research.
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Introduction: Sociology and Democracy 
Voting is the impetus of a citizen-governed democracy. The voting process 
is highly complex, expensive, and idiosyncratic, and is a monumental product of 
the history of democratic and republic governments around the world. In 
America, that history is no less profound. Whose rights to participate in the 
process have been recognized? Whose have been barred? What historical 
patterns seem to vanish, but reify? 
“Men are so constituted that they derive their conviction of their own 
possibilities largely from the estimate formed of them by others. If 
nothing is expected of a people, that people will find it difficult to 
contradict that expectation. By depriving us of suffrage, you affirm our 
incapacity to form an intelligent judgment respecting public men and 
public measures; you declare before the world that we are unfit to 
exercise the elective franchise, and by this means lead us to undervalue 
ourselves, to put a low estimate upon ourselves, and to feel that we have 
no possibilities like other men.”  
Frederick Douglass nails the fundamental issue which has plagued, and still 
plagues, racial minorities to this day. As conservative action and rhetoric continues to 
impede the access of our impoverished to the polls, the right of enfranchisement is denied 
to those who need it most. One of the many pieces that could help advance minority 
socioeconomic status, and therefore, equity, among the American populace, is complete 
and full access to this vital right. To understand how this happened in a country that 
prides itself as a beacon of democracy, we must look backward in time. 
Hundreds of years ago, mainstream political perspective gave no voice to most 
citizens, including women, working men, and slaves. Only if you were a white, property-
owning male were you eligible to vote. After the Civil War, the newly-freed slaves from 
the South were either frequently arrested and put to work, or murdered en masse. 
Klansmen “poll watchers” terrorized and sometimes killed former slaves who attempted 
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to vote (Herbert 2016). After the Reconstruction era, Jim Crow laws ensured continued 
segregation and fear as America grew. Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, 
levels of incarceration have grown dramatically. This “mass incarceration” of Americans 
was, in large part, spawned by the “War on Drugs” (Massey 2007; Alexander 2012). Many 
of these Americans are minorities and poor, and particularly, black. The United States is 
home to nearly a fourth of the world’s prison population, despite comprising only five 
percent of its total population (DuVernay 2016). 
Since it sounds reasonable that a convicted felon has forfeited his or her right to 
vote, we must be especially wary of the unusual nature of the United States prison system. 
While all thirty-seven European countries allow felons on probation, on parole, or having 
fully served time, to vote (Stuart 2002), twenty-nine states do not permit a felon this right, 
even after serving their full sentence (Massey 2007). Seven million Americans fell under 
these categories, or were still in the prison system, in 2007 (Alexander 2012), which 
meant a significant number of people in the United States were unable to vote. Thus, this 
vulnerable segment of our society “is rendered figuratively ‘invisible’ to policymakers and 
the public” (Massey 2007).  
The consequence of this disenfranchisement should be concerning. If a former 
prisoner cannot vote, what political incentive is there for a candidate to consider 
prisoners’ life outcomes? Ideally, we would hope any criminal could find their way back 
to full citizenry, righteously voting for policies and policy makers they view as helpful in 
fostering a better government. If an American breaks the law, they ought to be encouraged 
to pay their debt to society, and the incentive to have a say in our democracy should be a 
light at the end of their tunnel of imprisonment. While the inconvenient truth may be, we 
can accompany it with the idea that our correctional institutions prevent the repetition of 
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crimes. Further, we might expect that our other institutions (e.g. education system, 
welfare system) help to keep crime rates low. Examining ways to improve these 
institutions falls beyond the scope of this analysis. 
The baggage of a historically racist hegemony continues to impede minorities’ 
participation, directly or indirectly, in the writing and revising of the laws which govern 
our social contract. Today, that struggle persists under newer, colorblind methods of 
discrimination. In 2013, members of North Carolina’s legislature, for example, opted for 
“legalized discrimination,” via a law requiring would-be voters to provide photo 
identification (Blake 2013). The new attacks on suffrage have been described as worthy, 
necessary, and responsible, just as Jim Crow laws were seen by southern whites as 
necessary to uphold integrity among both whites and blacks. North Carolina’s ID law 
allowed the use of driver’s licenses and passports, but not college or state assistance 
programs (Barnes 2016). It’s the same game under a new name. 
Contemporary Legal Battles 
Let us examine how this modern form of oppression came to operate. The legal 
history of the United States provides two general perspectives in analyzing discrimination 
against minority groups: victimization, and perpetration. The latter supposes the 
problems facing a given minority member, in the court of law, are only legitimate when a 
specific target or “perpetrator” can be identified as the culprit of injustice. Laws are 
enacted, which intend to neutralize the wrongdoings of individuals (Freeman 1978). The 
key word here is “individuals.” Such an ideology is remarkably analogous with the notion, 
in business or industry, of identifying “the root cause” to a defect in a manufacturing 
process. By this, we mean a single point in a system which is responsible for a bad 
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outcome. Cutting-edge approaches to workplace cognitive engineering refute the “root 
cause analysis” for its overt blindness to the legitimacy of entire system. From this 
perspective, simply removing “bad apples” (e.g., firing the supposedly ill-intentioned 
worker, replacing a single part of a machine, etc.) is never a solution. Ridden with 
hindsight bias, retrospective judgments on those who “cause” the accident frame the 
individual “perpetrator” as the problem, and in doing so, fail to examine the complete 
system (Dekker 2014). This concept is particularly helpful in assisting the dialogue of our 
unremitting racial caste system. In contrast to the “perpetrator” identification, a “victim” 
approach views the conditions which permit victimization as tacitly problematic, rather 
than innocent. In his article, Freeman continued by suggesting that the “perpetrator” 
concept embedded in our legislation not only allows policies which perpetuate the 
harmful status quo, but “creates the class of innocents who need not feel any personal 
responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel 
great resentment when called upon to bear any burdens in connection with remedying 
violations.” Today, we must recognize accusatory language toward the poor as what it 
truly is: a method to silence certain groups of people in the very moment they wish to 
speak. The American value of individualism rests at the core of the argument claiming an 
individual’s personal results and consequences are fully the product of their own control. 
Consider the quote of former North Carolina GOP executive committee member 
Don Yelton, discussing his justification for the 2013 voter-ID law with Aasif Mandvi: 
“The law is gonna kick the Democrats in the butt...If it hurts a bunch of 
college kids that’s too lazy to get up off their bull-honkers and go get a 
photo ID, so be it. If it hurts the whites, so be it. If it hurts a bunch of 
lazy blacks that wants to have the government give them everything, so 
be it.” 
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These offensive comments not only redact any potential desire to promote the integrity of 
the election system, but play substantively into the narrative of individualism. In 2006 
alone, a study (de Alth 2009) estimated as many as four and a half million Americans 
were disenfranchised by both photo and non-photo identification voting laws. 
Interestingly, the quote was a small piece of evidence cited in the 2016 ruling by the 4th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, deeming the law unconstitutional. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an essential and critical armament for 
minorities in the fight for suffrage. The Justice Department found proof of racial 
discrimination in Texas’s redistricting plan disputed in Perez vs. Texas; the Republican 
held Texas legislature’s defense claimed the plan was intended to help keep Republicans 
in control, and any effects on minority voters were “incidental.” In other words, “Is this 
about party, or race?” Probably both (Hasen 2014). Unfortunately, important portions of 
the Voting Rights Act were nullified in 2013 (Liptak 2013). This decision may open the 
path for an extension of strange, partisan, classist, or racist gerrymandering and 
redistricting in the future. Another case in Texas, Veasey vs. Abbott, was concerned with 
contentious voter photo identification legislation. Similar to the North Carolina case, 
acceptable forms of identification would be a driver’s license, firearm license, passport, 
veteran’s identification, or a birth certificate, while student, state and local government, 
and federal government identification would not be accepted (Herbert 2016). Those who 
attacked the legislation argued that it amounted to blatant discrimination toward not just 
specific minorities, but groups which are perceived to be less likely to vote Republican. 
Neither can be acceptable to any person interested in a functioning democracy. 
In theory, it would behoove a political party to secure the vote of all groups of 
people, rather than cheat some of them out of access to the democratic process. But, from 
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a conflict theorist sociological perspective, we understand that this is expensive, 
unnecessary, and does not benefit the rich, who heavily control our democratic process. 
The benefits of a short-term seizure of power has blinded legislatures to the long-term 
consequence: retaliation, divisiveness, and exacerbated political polarization. Wealth and 
power are more important than fair democracy, to the elites. 
Recent years have witnessed the spread of photo-identification requirements for 
voting in other states. Each of these are justified as protections against voter fraud. For 
example, a case from Indiana, Crawford vs. Marion County Election Board, held that the 
plaintiffs could not show that the photo-identification laws were severe in burden to 
voters. The Court, however, acknowledged there is no evidence of voter fraud, but the 
basis of their ruling lay in aiding American voters’ confidence. Notes from the case 
reflected a Rasmussen poll indicating that a certain percentage of voters believed some 
level of fraud existed in the process (Heller 2009). Of course, if actual instances of fraud 
were rampant, we could justify the implementation of laws that attempt to purify the 
election process. Americans are indeed rather supportive of a voter photo identification 
requirement, at eighty-five percent (McCarthy 2016). So, does systematic voter fraud 
occur? And how detrimental is it to our democracy? 
In her 2010 book, The Myth of Voter Fraud, Lorraine Minnite explores these 
questions. She concluded, in one chapter, through an economic calculus, that attempting 
to commit election fraud on any basis is particularly irrational, suggesting the incentive 
to cast an illegal ballot, when coupled with the probability of being charged with felony, 
strongly outweigh any perceived benefit of embarking on fraud for most rational decision 
makers. Richman (et al. 2014) found that small amounts of non-citizens have registered 
and are voting in elections. This is the most precarious notion of election fraud in the 
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United States, because individuals are not forced to disclose citizenship status when 
registering to vote. Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted found 385 registered non-citizens, 
82 of which voted in the state of Ohio in 2016 elections (Ohio Investigation 2017). 
Although this does raise questions about the integrity of the elections, Richman claims 
that voter ID laws do not help to ameliorate the issue. 
Voter fraud takes on multiple legal definitions, and these vary from state to state. 
The opaque nature of the definition leaves room for haphazard scrutiny. From 1994 to 
2006, the California Secretary of State: Election Fraud Investigations Unit found that only 
83 of 1,600 cases involving potential voting fraud resulted in some type of intentional 
criminal activity. Of those eighty-three, only twenty-nine were directly related to the 
voting process, while the others were registration fraud. Additionally, Minnite reviewed a 
report by the American Center for Voting Rights, a non-profit organization founded in 
2005, which has since been dissolved. The report depicted 116 cases of fraud in fifteen 
states during the 2004 election, which supposedly resulted in almost 300,000 affected 
votes. She found that only forty-eight of these votes were corroborated by outside sources. 
Despite the apparent overall lack of evidence showing our elections have been seriously 
compromised, the constant allegations of rigged elections keep pundits and reporters 
questioning, and tend to make voter photo identification policies seem reasonable, if not 
necessary, in the eyes of our high courts (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008; Levitt 2007). 
Still, it is worth considering the effort expended to scheme a rigged national election. 
True, politics as usual involves the widespread dissemination of false or misleading 
information by big-moneyed interests, which influences the decisions of large and 
potentially decisive blocs of voters (see Mayer 2016, Wilcox and Berry 2009, Levitt 2010). 
But the possibility of manipulating large numbers of votes by sending unqualified voters 
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to the polls is highly implausible. Given the differences among cities, states, and localities, 
and the numerous bureaucracies involved, influencing such a complex and large scale 
operation would be incredibly expensive and seemingly impossible. While petty voter 
fraud does seem to take place (e.g. double voting, voting non-citizens), its existence 
appears infrequent in the grand scheme. Moreover, the potential for manipulative success 
decreases as the size of the electorate increases. In other words, the higher the stakes of 
the election, the more difficult it is to corrupt. 
Photo-identification requirements or other laws, such as banning early voting, 
increasing the costs to the polls can unequally impede members of our citizenry. Any 
given citizen is more likely to vote if the cost to do so is minimized, but the deterring effect 
of increasing costs is greatest for those with low incomes, physical disabilities, or other 
impediments. This means those who have a more expensive path to the polls are targeted 
for disenfranchisement when restrictive policies regarding access are enacted. The 
elderly, racial and ethnic minorities, and those with limited education are at most risk for 
political silence (Barreto, Nuño, and Sanchez 2009) through these various requirements. 
As we have discussed, evidence of impersonation fraud at the poll place is lacking, and 
most fraud instances involve absentee ballots (Kahn 2012; Fogarty et al. forthcoming). 
Simply put, poor people or college students may lack the resources to obtain the correct 
identification for Election Day, and the effective result is discrimination. Given that 
participation in elections is already so low in the United States, further restrictions 
seriously impede the efforts to encourage voters to attend the polls. 
We must remember that power is distributed throughout the arms of state boards 
of elections, and the attitudes and behaviors of poll workers at the “street level” can have 
an important impact on the voting experience. “The positive aspects of street-level 
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influence can be maximized and the negative aspects minimized when service 
organizations are designed to engage, rather than mute, street-level worker perspectives 
on how policy should be implemented (Maynard-Moody 1990).” Enforcement of new 
rules by poll workers tends to be ambiguous. Atkeson (et al. 2010) explored the hypothesis 
of a heterogeneous application of a New Mexico voting law. Hispanic male voters were far 
more likely (92% chance) to be charged with showing identification at the polls, compared 
with a 69% chance for the median voter. While a verbal testament of name, year of birth, 
and the last four digits of social security were the minimum requirement, Atkeson found 
poll workers were not impartial, and specific demographics were profiled practice that 
was perceived as discriminatory by the affected voters, and that may well undermine their 
faith in the process. This evidence corroborates the reality that our “street-level 
bureaucrats” obtain the responsibility therein to create a real level of satisfaction and 
efficacy among participants in the political process (Claassen 2008). Generating 
enthusiasm for successful political participation in the public is crucial to our democracy 
and efforts must be made to refute options that foster a distaste for any group of people. 
Election board officials must see to the execution of just elections. 
To conclude this section, I argue the incredible importance of historical context 
when we address social issues. A technical solution to a social problem is tricky and 
nuanced, and thus an understanding of the deep-rooted structural issues embedded in 
our society is gravely important for successful implementation. While I have touched on 
some major points of emphasis, this review scratches the surface of the long history of the 
experiment of democracy. Nonetheless, we can remain optimistic that the efforts of 
rigorous and technical precision can assist agencies in our pursuit of equity. 
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Technical Features of the Election Process 
Not all of the impediments to voting access are the direct result of deliberate 
discrimination or restrictive voting legislation. Allen and Bernsteyn (2006) applied 
m/m/k queuing theory analysis to 2004 Franklin County, Ohio elections and concluded 
that increased ballot lengths (which are typically found in highly populated or urban 
areas) inevitably result in lengthier poll booth times, which in turn cause a longer line at 
the voting center. Figure 1 illustrates the general process for queuing. 
 
 
Citizens who vote more often are likely to have a faster voting pace than those who 
do not regularly vote (Stein et al. 2008). The converse effect is an increase of average 
voting process times in high population density areas, especially in an election of higher 
turnout than normal. Indeed, Allen (2013) estimates that in central Florida, in November 
of 2012, nearly 50,000 potential voters were deterred by long lines. Many pieces of 
research have investigated the one-day resource-allocation problem, because of its 
complexity. Deploying voting machines is an operational feat because of the 
unpredictable nature of voter turnout and policy changes. See Yang (et al. 2013) for 
recommendations made on the idea of same day transports of voting machines; that is, to 
Figure 1. Illustration of Voting Process in m/m/k Queuing Theory (Image Credit: Allen) 
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transport the machine from one polling place to another based on shifts in demand 
expectations. 
In the 2012 election Sandoval County, New Mexico, a misallocation of voting 
booths was detrimental. Extremely long lines plagued the Rio Rancho area. Republican 
voters were effectively disenfranchised. Using methods like those of Allen and Bernsteyn, 
Huang calculated that multiple Republican candidates were blocked from office via 
disenfranchisement of many deterred potential voters, with very high probability. 
Fleming vs. Gutierrez resulted from this debacle, in which an injunction ordering 
compliance with allocation solutions was ordered for 2014 (Huang 2016).  
Ted Allen was consulted by the Franklin County Board of Elections for the 2016 
elections. Huang’s Indifference-Zone Generalized Binary Search (IZGBS) software was 
used an optimal allocation of resources (poll workers and voting machines) for the 
previous election in Franklin County, Ohio. This election was rather successful, but 
mostly because of the large amount of early voting. To cultivate up-to-date data on voting 
times for the model parameter, Ted Allen and I sat in the Franklin County Board of 
Elections to observe early voters. We observed the times that specific voters cast their 
ballots. This process, coupled with a regression on the file size of the ballots (a precise 
proxy for the length of the ballot) led us to estimate a voting time parameter of 12 seconds 
per item on the ballot. Figure 2 shows these results, which were used in his analysis and 
recommendation. This process was able to ensure a waiting time of under eighty minutes, 
given a worst-case voter turn-out or non-steady state arrival rate situation. 
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Figure 2. Random Sample of Vote Times from Early Vote Center 
A surprising finding revealed that the presence of experienced poll workers was 
correlated with slower poll processing times. One explanation might be that these workers 
feel more relaxed throughout the Election Day, or they may be confused about enforcing 
a new policy or procedure (Spencer and Markovits 2010). When legislatures do not allow 
early voting, or heavily restrict it, parameter is (intuitively) clogged and makes the 
sufficient allocation of machines very expensive or unattainable. 
The poll process (or service) parameter is also strongly affected by the usability of 
the voting machine. Many recommendations have been made to help with this issue. The 
infamous 2000 election with the “hanging chads” outlawed the punch card system. 
Particularly, the drop-off rate (also described as the “residual”) is much lower with Direct 
Recording Equipment (DRE) machines (Tomz 2003, Kimball 2008). To explain, a 
residual ballot does not contain a vote for each race listed in the ballot. Also, the design 
aspects of the older punch card system tended to have unintended effects of 
disenfranchisement (Roth 1998). Americans with Disabilities Act compliance is a must 
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for election systems to achieve state certification. A voting machine’s touch screen that 
mirrors human heuristics is highly navigable. Training poll workers to quickly coach 
voters on the proper use of a voting machine cannot replace the effectiveness of a well-
designed interface. 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 was a major expenditure by the U.S. Federal 
Government and required state compliance with many aspects of integrity-driven 
elections. Specifically, it mandated and invested in the optical scan vote counting system 
and the DRE voting machines that central Ohioans use today (Damschroder 2013). The 
DRE machines record the vote onto a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), which 
generate the legally representative paper trails. Some vulnerabilities have been shown 
with DREs, such as tampered screen calibrations (Antonyan et al. 2009) and potential 
capacity for a machine to be afflicted with malware (Aviv et al. 2008). Internal 
procedures, such as multi-party access to physical locations of vote machines, ballot 
counting rooms, data access, and storage areas help create an environment of security at 
the Franklin County Board of Elections (Leonard and Payne 2017). 
The usability of the machine is intrinsically linked to voters’ confidence in the 
election system. Claassen (et al. 2013) and Everett (et al. 2008) found contradictory 
results in voter confidence based on system type (machine or paper). Research on the 
usability of these systems is rampant (see Byrne et al. 2007, Norden et al. 2006, Bederson 
et al. 2003). Remote electronic voting options (voting with a cell phone) appear to be 
surfacing (Yao et al. 2006), although there is much greater fear of corruption in this space. 
As discussed, DRE machines utilize the VVPAT for security. Rezende (2004) 
proposed voter-verifiable systems, in which any random voter would act as an auditing 
agent. Acemyan (et al. 2014), Volkamer, and Olembo (2013) describe these as “end-to-
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end” (e2e) voting systems. Future research could examine whether something like this 
could work as an all-electronic or mobile voting option. Maybe an extension of this 
involves a random subset of voters which verify their own and a selection of, say, three of 
their own friends’ votes within their corner of the local election. Cryptographic and 
mathematical methods appear to be of potential use for the implementation of e-voting. 
These fall beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Why must we show up to a polling location on Election Day? The state of Oregon 
implemented a full, 100% vote by mail system in 1981 for local contests (Magleby 1987). 
Southwell (2004) found overwhelming support for the measure just five years after. 1998 
petition by the League of Women voters. Oregon has run elections as vote by mail ever 
since. Concerns about the security of these elections, frankly, do not come close to 
rejecting the obvious convenience of this system (Southwell 2016). Even if folks are weary 
of voting by mail, hybrid systems (part mail and part vote center) could increase 
acceptability. 
Australian elections are mandatory for their citizens. If the goal of a nation’s 
democracy is to maintain full participation, this is an effective way to do it. This system 
does, however, breed party stability (Mackerras and McAllister 1999). Possibly contrary 
to the imagination of the American reader, representation systems extend beyond that of 
winner-take-all. Plurality/Majority election systems are just that. However, Proportional 
Representation systems are based on party. Individuals vote for a party and then a 
predetermined set number of representatives are awarded positions based on the 
percentage of the vote gained. These systems tend to create atmospheres where women 
are placed in power, occurring more often than in individual winner-take-all elections 
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(Paxton et al. 2007). Other systems exist, such as Rank Voting (recently adopted by 
Maine) and Mixed Systems (Reynolds 2005). 
Perspectives On Issues Mapping 
Many tools and methods have been created by operations researchers and 
business-oriented academic disciplines to assist in the systems management and process 
improvement of products and services. Decision analysis, DMAIC (Define, Measure, 
Analyze, Improve, Control), Quality Function Deployment, Nominal Group Technique, 
Control Charting, Delphi Technique, Lean and 6σ are a non-exhaustive list of these tools. 
Only some of these tools are helpful when attempting to decipher a selection when the 
options are mostly qualitative. For example, a decision analysis can aid when selecting 
from qualitative options, but the options must be in an ordinal rank. Quality Function 
Deployment helps to identify qualitative features in product or service development, but 
works best with processes that occur repetitively, usually a daily production or service 
schedule. These are usually most applicable in private sector settings with competing 
firms. Because of these deficiencies, Ted Allen, others, and I completed an analysis for 
decision making problems in the context of military technology acquisition using a new 
framework. This same framework will be discussed here. 
A Perspectives On Issues Map (POIM) can be used in academic setting (as will be 
demonstrated) or in a day-to-day managerial setting. In both scenarios, the substance of 
the analysis is displayed in paraphrased form on the map. The map is to be used when 
deciphering or analyzing between a pair of alternatives. Directions for this method follow. 
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To clarify, this process is most useful when deciding between the status-quo and a 
new method. Its benefits include the maintaining of past points of discussion or critique 
when new information is introduced. This can be especially helpful when dialog between 
a manager and subordinates ensues, especially over multiple days, even weeks. This 
article will feature one POIM, to illustrate my own opinion, which emerged from the 
preceding research. 
Conclusions: Voting System POIM 
Figure 3 shows a POIM which is considering moving from pure precinct ballot 
casting to a hybrid system of precincts and mail in voting. Points on the graph which are 
black indicate an indifference toward the switch to hybrid, and points with the slanted 
pattern indicate considerations to a hybrid system. The x-axis indicates whether a given 
point of information assists with the assertion of social equality. The y-axis indicates 
whether a given point produces elections that are secure and traceable. Finally, the radii 
of the points on the POIM indicate the feasibility or likelihood of the realization of the 
proposed issue. For example, Proportional Representation would likely require a 
constitutional amendment at the federal level, or a referendum, therefore, its radius is 
small. 
Step 1.  Identify (new or revised) issues and metrics/dimensions. 
Step 2. Reach consensus about the metric (new or revised) values, ri,j for each 
issue i, and dimension j, and the top X quotes or perspectives. 
Step 3.  Plot the top 3 issues excerpting the top X documents below each issue and 
each alternative. Use a different marking for each course of action 
associated with a given assume. The dot radius depicts the value of the 
third dimension next to the issue title (if desired). 
Step 4. If a dot location has shifted, indicate the change using an arrow. 
Step 5.  As new documents and/or participants stream in, iterate Steps 1-4. 
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Figure 3. POIM for Voting Systems 
Although my knowledge on social movements is limited at this point, I can only 
speculate: to see major changes in how our democracy can be leveraged to work for all 
people, both rich and poor, a major social movement is almost a requirement. The form 
of social movements has shifted dramatically with the advent of the internet, while 
powerful business interests have monopolized the airways with mainstream news 
sources. Major shifts in our election system, such as a switch to compulsory voting, or 
proportional representation, are unlikely in the near term without such movements. 
Future research should focus on addressing the social needs of specific 
communities. Where is voter turnout the lowest? Is mobile-phone voting a potential way 
to help people vote? What are the security measures necessary to have a web-based voting 
system? What might be holding the rest of the states back from implementing a full vote-
by-mail system? Perhaps there are some cultural considerations: maybe people just enjoy 
18 
 
showing up to cast a ballot. What methods could be used, or are being used, by the power-
elite to ensure that vote-by-mail never happens on a national scale? 
While collecting data, I thoughtlessly asked an official for the password for wi-fi 
access at the Franklin County Board of Elections. Of course, the official said no, out of fear 
that I was attempting to hack their systems. He then retrieved his manager, who also came 
to question me. While this is no indication that our elections are perfectly secure, I was 
relieved to find that so much effort was taken to protect the process, after realizing I had 
no business requesting such information, given this was my first visit for research related 
purposes. The outcome of this situation bolstered my confidence in our democracy and 
the people who do the work on the ground to make our elections happen, and I hope that 
confidence is reflected to the reader. 
In interpersonal discussion, arguments can be forgotten or cast aside. This could 
be due to emotion, absenteeism, or impatience. The POIM allows for constructive dialog, 
because it allows the facts and reports to be kept on the table for discussion. But it is also 
simple enough to be understood by all. These strengths make POIMs versatile. 
While we submit that our election system stands as the institutional means for self-
governing, as I alluded to previously, it cannot be viewed as the sole provider of social 
change. When the system fails, other methods to demand representation, equality and 
fair life chances become necessary, when the time and conditions are right. Charles 
Wright Mills asked us to imagine the wide-ranging situations of others, to constantly put 
ourselves in the shoes of others. Empathy is the first step toward bringing about the 
greater good, and seeing to fair, just, and impartial elections. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Data Captured for Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Precinct 
Items on 
Ballot File Size Minutes 
COLUMBUS 48-E 01 36 40216.00 8.08 
COLUMBUS 02-A 01 36 40239.00 4.67 
COLUMBUS 02-B 01 36 40228.00 10.47 
COLUMBUS 10-E 01 36 40078.00 11.12 
COLUMBUS 45-A 01 36 40237.00 11.22 
CANAL WINCHESTER-F 01 31 33708.00 5.28 
COLUMBUS 19-B 02 37 40501.00 6.67 
COLUMBUS 30-B 02 36 40266.00 9.13 
COLUMBUS 54-C 01 36 40318.00 7.00 
WHITEHALL 04-B 01 31 33735.00 11.50 
GAHANNA 3 A 01 40 38906.00 8.33 
GROVE CITY 04-F 01 32 34102.00 5.17 
GAHANNA 04-E 01 40 38761.00 7.67 
GAHANNA 04-D 01 40 38912.00 6.50 
DUBLIN 01-C 01 32 34059.00 6.42 
COLUMBUS 70-A 01 36 40220.00 5.50 
HILLIARD 03-E 01 33 34830.00 7.00 
JEFFERSON-D 01 31 33669.00 5.00 
JEFFERSON-D 01 31 33669.00 5.00 
COLS 18-F 01 36 40261.00 4.20 
COLS 56-D 01 36 40578.00 3.67 
WHITEHALL 04-B 01 31 33735.00 5.83 
Bexley 4-A 01 32 34306.00 9.75 
COLS 14-E 01 36 40247.00 5.45 
COLS 14-E 36 40247.00 11.73 
COLS 14-E 36 40247.00 11.72 
COLS 52-C 01 36 40218.00 5.97 
COLS 52-F 02 36 40224.00 7.42 
COLS 43-C 01 36 40193.00 2.50 
COL 12-C 01 36 40226.00 5.35 
